



24 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : Closing Address, Midcareer Course No. 2,
20 February 1964

General Carter spoke for about twenty minutes.

In presenting him I made briefly the following four points as my summary observations of this Course:

1. The time and earnestness which both Agency and Government officials had devoted to preparing and presenting their subjects was very impressive.

2. The chief substantive characteristic had been the setting forth of significant factors new to the group in the Agency, the U.S.A., and the world in general, with these subjects presented at a very high quality level.

3. The opportunity for officers at this level to exchange ideas and thus to acquaint themselves with the roles of, and personalities in, other parts of the Agency, had not been given since the days of OSS and that this had been an element in the Course of the greatest importance.

4. That after six weeks of close association one could be surprised and reassured at the talent, abilities, and range of backgrounds and interests of the members of this Course.

General Carter began by saying that he had intended himself to make points somewhat of this kind and that he was in full agreement. He went on to state that:

- a. Mr. McCone, he himself, and Mr. Kirkpatrick attached the greatest importance not only to the Midcareer Course but to the Program as a whole

and that as long as they were in charge they would put great emphasis upon it. We could depend upon full participation by top Agency and Government officials. He stated with emphasis that although he had not had extensive intelligence experience, he felt that he could contribute to the Agency in the fields of administration, management and career development.

b. These three Agency officials were very anxious to develop "Agency officers" which he defined as persons whose background and experience would allow them to represent the Agency in the most favorable fashion, across the board, outside the Agency both here and overseas. He mentioned as examples of the benefits of cross-fertilization Ray Cline, Dez Fitzgerald, Tweedy, and the assignment of [redacted] as DDTR. STAT

c. He cited as a warning example of the necessity for broadening one's competence (this he had also cited at the closing address of the first Course) his own experience of having developed a speciality which he thought would be his own for the rest of his career and how this had been superseded by the advent of radar.

d. He congratulated the members of the group on having been chosen for the Course and said that he expected that from their ranks would be chosen the new Agency leadership. He said that they would be under close scrutiny and that attention would be given to planning the rest of their Midcareer Programs. On this point, in reply to a question as to how the Programs would be planned, he said that the programmings themselves would be done by the Deputy Directorates, but at the command of the DCI and the DDCI. He had noted that the Agency was responsive to instruction from this quarter.

He ended by expressing regrets that he could not leave the "pickle factory" long enough to join us at cocktails at the Carriage House to which we had invited him. He then gave out the certificates.

[redacted]
Chief, Midcareer and
Senior Officers Courses

STAT

STAT

OPENING
~~OPENING~~ REMARKS FOR MID-CAREER TRAINING COURSE
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

ILLEGIB

I. Importance DCI and I attach to mid-career training

- A. We both intend to continue to give this our emphasis and full support.
- B. We need this to build the Agency's future executives. They will come from people like you.

II. Also need this type of mid-career training as something designed to continue and enhance the professionalism of our Agency officers.

- A. DCI and I are impressed that this Agency contains more professionalism, objectivity, talent, and brains than any other outfit -- governmental or otherwise -- ~~that~~ we have ever been privileged to be associated with.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

B. My 2 1/2 years as DDCI has been a real privilege and I feel deep humility in being part of CIA.

III. You don't keep professionalism and objectivity -- the essential traits -- merely by talking about it.

A. You must train those below and create an atmosphere for new ideas, new approaches, and new development.

B. You must administer and supervise properly. Must know your people. Without it, we go into a rut.

C. Must practice rigorous security. This is a responsibility of every single one of us and is a particular responsibility of each and every

superior
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

- 2 - **SECRET**

85X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

1. The case has brought a hard new look at personnel

security, and other agencies such as NSA and DOD have begun

to adopt many of our superior security programs. j

IV. While security needs increase, the DCI and I are also increasingly aware of the need to broaden selected Agency officers.

A. Your course joins you with officers from all Agency components and you are learning things about those components -- their missions and their problems -- that will be invaluable to you as background and experience.

B. Compartmentation will always be with us -- of necessity, but we have been forced to knock it down to some extent.

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

- 5 - SECRET

SECRET

C. ~~Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4~~
Morning meetings -- all senior officers present, No holds barred.

D. Need for Agency representatives at inter-departmental meetings.

V. The Agency image.

A. With people who count, we stand high.

B. Be braced for more whipping of the Agency in this, an election year.

C. No question but that books like The Invisible Government do us and the US Government harm, but we don't take attacks like this lying down.

By and large, however, there is little to be gained by making frontal assaults on our attackers. We must grit our teeth and get on with the job.

VI. The recurring claim that the Agency unilaterally makes foreign policy and

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

SECRET

SECRET

end-runs the approval of the Government is the falsest of all.

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

25X1

C. Checks and balances within the Agency (DCI or DDCI project approval; audits; IG, and the like).

VII. In sum, you can be proud of the Agency and its work. DCI and I are. We look to each of you to move on up the ladder and we look to each of you to accomplish tasks, make decisions, and administer your people in such a way that the Agency can remain a source of pride -- for us, for the US Government, and for the American people.

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

SECRET

MIDCAREER COURSE



PART I

SEPTEMBER 21 - OCTOBER 30, 1964

SECRET

Next 27 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4



Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4



COMMANDANT
MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

Noted by DD CI
9/3/64

2 SEP 1964

Dear General Carter:

I wish to express my sincere appreciation for your outstanding presentation to the staff and students of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College last week.

The fact that you took the time from your very busy and pressing schedule to address the student body, coupled with your frank and honest appraisal of the world situation was particularly gratifying. Moreover your willing approach and direct response to questions was both rewarding and stimulating.

We here believe that there is no substitute in an education program for the opportunity of meeting face-to-face an official directly concerned in the formulation and execution of policies of our country. The knowledge such a speaker possesses coupled with his ability to examine a subject in depth, projecting his own evaluations and judgments into the discussion, challenges the listener, prods his mind and contributes, probably more than anything else, to the development of the intellectual leadership we are endeavoring to foster in the student of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Your address last week more than met the criteria which we have established for our guest lecture program. We are particularly pleased that your presentation was scheduled during the first week of the academic year when it is imperative to establish standards and set the tone for the course.

Staff members and students alike were sincerely and deeply impressed by you and your remarks. We look forward to having you again at Marine Corps Schools.

Sincerely,

F. L. WIESEMAN

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Original - ER
✓ 1 - DD CI

SECRET
EYES ONLY

31 August 1964

General Carter:

There were three questions that came up during your speech to the officers at Quantico which were particularly intriguing. I have consulted with the experts to see what the line is on each and thought you would be interested.

1. Would the demise of Khrushchev and/or Mao change things in the Sino Soviet split?

The experts say that there would be a chance for an appearance of a papering-over of the rift, but we doubt that this would last long because we are convinced the basic issues and disputes are too profound to be papered-over for any significant length of time. ✓

We think, for example, that some Chinese Communist leaders, if they came to full power, might agree to hold fire in return for a resumption of badly needed Soviet aid. In this event, however, the Soviet price would come high and this alone would tend to aggravate the basic differences. ✓

2. Have we made an intelligence assessment of the successor possibilities, particularly in Communist China?

In China, Mao's top Lieutenant is Liu Shao chi, and paper arrangements have been made for him to take over as Mao's successor. As your answer to the class indicated, however, everything is up for grabs in a Communist state when the leader disappears. Whether Liu could make his position stick is anyone's guess. ✓

In the USSR, Brezhnev and Podgorny are the paramount leaders below Khrushchev, and one or the other is the likely successor. ✓

Our basic problem is that neither in the USSR nor in China do we know much about the levels just below the top lieutenants -- the hot-shots, say, in their late 40's, and it is from these levels that future successors are bound to appear. ✓

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET
EYES ONLY

3. What do we know about Soviet Command-and-Control?

As your answer indicated, we know very little. In terms of tactical military response to such things as overflight violation, etc., the information flows via military networks to Moscow. In some cases, regional air defense commanders appear to have some authority to authorize defensive military reactions, but we are inclined to believe that major defensive actions which could result in combat are probably checked out directly with Khrushchev before the final decision is made. ✓

In terms of grandiose military strategy and operational planning, we are aware of the existence of a "Higher Military Council" which appears to be a sort of Soviet equivalent of the NSC. The Council is chaired by Khrushchev, it includes the 10 or 12 members of the highest level body -- the Soviet Presidium, and it includes "high ranking military members." This body is obviously too unwieldy to meet in crash circumstances, but it would be the body to meet and consider various courses of action in fluid situations, much as our NSC Executive Committee meets to consider courses of action in Vietnam. ✓



25X1

SECRET
EYES ONLY



Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

RINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE CORPS EDUCATIONAL CENTER
MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA

*Noted by MSC
sent to C-11
for file in
June 65*

TOP SECRET

45K/pkb
Ser: 00045KA15365.
JUN 2 1965

From: Director, Marine Corps Command and Staff College
To: Lieutenant General Marshall S. CARTER, USA
Director, National Security Agency
Fort Meade, Maryland

Subj: Presentation of "Threat to the Free World" to
students of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College
on 22 August 1964

Encl: (1) Subject transcript

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as requested.
2. This letter is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of enclosure.

F. J. Harte
F. J. HARTE
Acting

TS#188672
Copy #1

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

Next 68 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

4654/1

4 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

1. As the attached letter to me indicates, I will be addressing the Senior Course at the Marine Corps School on 25 August on the subject, "The Threat to the Free World".

2. Please prepare some briefing notes for me at the TOP SECRET level. I believe the notes should go beyond the subject of the Sino-Soviet threat and should include as well a brief description of the world situation. The notes should be geared to the one-hour presentation. I would appreciate having the notes in hand by COB 21 August.

101
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

101
MAR 10 11 41 AM '64
JUL

25X1 [] :lcv (29 Jun 64)

Distribution

Orig - Adse

1 - []

1 - suspense

1 - []

CONFIDENTIAL

WVL

7 July 1964

Lt. General F. L. Wieseman, USMC
Commandant, Marine Corps Schools
Quantico, Virginia 22134

Dear General Wieseman:

I have your letter of 26 June. I am delighted to appear at the Marine Corps School on 25 August to make an address on "The Threat to the Free World."

Lieutenant Colonel Mize, whom you have designated as escort officer, has already been in touch with my assistant, [redacted] and precise arrangements can be worked out as we get closer to the 25 August date. Incidentally, Mr. [redacted] will be on leave during most of August and Lt. Colonel Mize can contact [redacted] who will be acting as my assistant during that time.

I look forward to the opportunity of seeing you and addressing the Senior Course.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Marshall S. Carter

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

[redacted]:lcv

Distribution:

Orig - Adse

1 - ER

1 - EA/DC [redacted]



Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

COMMANDANT
MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

Executive Registry

601-4654

26 JUN 1964

Dear General Carter:

I was delighted to hear from Mr. McCone in his letter to General Walt that you can come to Quantico to address the Senior Course on 25 August 1964 on the subject, "The Threat to the Free World".

The Senior Course provides professional education for officers of the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel to prepare them for command at the regiment/group level; for staff duty at the division/wing and higher levels and for duty with departmental, combined, joint and high level Service organizations. There will be approximately 125 officers in the class, mainly Marines but also including U. S. Army, Navy and Air Force officers. These officers all possess TOP SECRET clearances. We plan to exclude our foreign students who possess only CONFIDENTIAL clearances. This presentation, "The Threat to the Free World", is part of a subcourse covering the Geopolitical and Current World Situation and is intended to be a current appraisal of the forces and circumstances which threaten the peace of the Free World. A companion lecture which will follow yours will specifically discuss the philosophy and ideology underlying international Communism.

The presentation is scheduled from 1030 to 1220 on 25 August. Our guest lectures usually consist of a one-hour lecture followed by a short break with at least 30 minutes of the second hour devoted to a question and answer period. You may use the time though in any way you desire.

Lieutenant Colonel C. D. Mize, USMC, Marine Corps Schools, Code 136, extension 2-6129, will be your escort officer during your visit. Please call on him for any assistance you may require in the preparation of training aids, in arranging transportation or concerning the content and coverage of instructional material. Lieutenant Colonel Mize will also be glad to call on you at a location you designate should you so desire.

We are very much looking forward to your visit and hope you will be able to remain as our guest for luncheon.

Sincerely,


F. L. WIESEMAN

Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

COMMANDANT
Marine Corps Schools
Quantico, Virginia 22134



26 JUN 1964

Dear Mr. McCone:

Thank you for your letter of 16 June. We regret your inability to accept our invitation to speak to the Senior Course on 25 August but fully appreciate your busy and demanding schedule.

Your selection of General Carter is greatly appreciated and we will be delighted to welcome him to Quantico. A letter will be forwarded to him with pertinent information.

Again, thank you for your assistance and cooperation.

Sincerely,

F. L. WIESEMAN
Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps


Honorable John W. McCone
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Orig - ER

70M 53 10 21 11 24

70M 53 1 51 6W 24

70M 53 3 04 6W 24



SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

Spencer file

EXPLOITING THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD

By

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter

"This is an official document of The National War College. Quotation from Abstraction from, or Reproduction of all or any part of this document is NOT AUTHORIZED without specific permission of the Commandant of The National War College.

Presented at
The National War College
Washington, D. C.
17 July 1964

NWC SECRET

Control No. *854-64*

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

SECRET

Copy # *2* of *4* copies

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

EXPLOITING THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD

By

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter

(17 July 1964)

GENERAL GRISWOLD: (Introduced the speaker).

GENERAL CARTER: Thank you, General Griswold. That is one of the nicest obituaries I have had:-

And this business about the CIA reminds me of a visit I made to the Army War College several months ago to talk to them on a subject of my own choosing and with my own notes, a little bit different than this morning, and General Train, a broken down classmate of mine, made the introduction. He had just started when an MP came in the door. This created considerable excitement. General Train asked him why and he said he had just received a telegram from Washington that this place had to be shaken down and they tried to stop it but he continued. And up here underneath the podium he came out with a great big bomb with a smoking fuse. This was a gag put on by the War College, not by the CIA.

A few minutes later also in this introduction, from behind the curtain came in very broken Russian, "The Song of the Volga Boatman" and General Train had to stop and find out what this was all about and here sure enough was a man with a cape and a slouch hat sitting there singing. General Train informed him that he could

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

not be there; this was a classified lecture by the Deputy Director ^{Central} of Intelligence and he had to leave. So he turned and he said, "Well, Helga, you take over." And out came one of their favorite secretaries built like a --well, like a bumble bee and she came out and she had on a very low cut black evening gown. I was sitting over there and she came over and switched it at me a couple times and then walked out and said, "I will see you later." This was a spy technique of the Army War College. It gave me an opportunity, however, to cut my remarks very short because I obviously had another engagement just as soon as----- (laughter).

Substituting for Mr. McCone is a real chore. And I will not attempt to in any way put on the type of erudite, learned, very deep floor show of which he is very capable. I will go into the typical song and dance of an Army officer who has been exposed to three years in the State Department, two years in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, two plus years in the Central Intelligence Agency.

I do not pretend to have any degree of diplomacy in my makeup, in spite of my background; and if I say anything or do anything that seems the least bit out of line, it is not only intentional, it could also be inadvertent. I will eventually get around to a subject here but I am getting the shakes out of my knees by indicating to some extent the degree of stupidity to which you are being subjected this morning.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

I had shortly been assigned to the State Department. I was down in Brazil for an inter-American conference--holding General Marshall's horse at the time; he was the Secretary--and the Ambassador was showing us around the residence, and he was very proud of it. He was a real old school Ambassador--protocol up to his navel and beyond that a real diplomatic posture. As we were coming up the stairs, a circular staircase--as we were coming up this circular staircase we went into a large ballroom; and he turned to me and said, "And General, how long have you been in the diplomatic service?" I was just about to tell him, when I looked at the end of the ballroom and here were two portraits of obviously nineteenth century types with goatees and sidewinders and I said: "Who are those two jokers?" "Oh," the Ambassador said, "Those are my grandfathers and I withdraw my previous question." As I say, if I say anything or do anything wrong you will now understand at least some of the basic reasons why.

The subject of the talk that General Griswold assigned to Mr. McCone went to him in writing and he looked at it and he thought it over and he said, "Well, I am not going to talk about that. So write a polite letter down to General Griswold and indicate to him that it is an interesting subject and it is fraught with this and that but I don't think I will really talk about that. I am sort of going to go around the corner and do this and that." So one of his

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

staff assistants wrote this letter and he got a very polite reply from General Griswold which said: We understand the situation perfectly; talk about anything you want to but cover the subject. This was in one of the most diplomatic phraseology you could ever imagine and I was stuck with it.

However, I am really going to have to back off because exploiting vulnerabilities of the communist world is something that is done every day at the policy level in the State Department and also, *in accordance with US policy*, at the policy level, in spite of what you might read, in the Central Intelligence Agency. The State Department does it overtly. We do it overtly. We also do it covertly and clandestinely. And I would not obviously want to get into the details of just what the procedures are, how we go about it, what the long-range purpose of it is. I would like, however, to tell you something of what we are faced with in the Soviet Union, in Communist China, and in the general communist movement throughout the world.

I know you have probably had this ad infinitum ad nauseam but perhaps coming from one who has a tremendously capable staff who does nothing but worry about this and puts the words in my mouth perhaps it will have an additional impact on you when you go back to earning an honest living again and perhaps in positions of tremendous influence where you can assist.

Now, the principal and main and real worrisome military threat and the challenge to the U. S. centers in the Soviet Union,

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

nowhere else. And in the Soviet Union's capacity for offensive as well as defensive war and particularly in their ground forces for relatively limited or conventional war and in their missileery--ICBM's and others--for longer range and more dangerous types of war. But in considering the threat of the Soviet Union, and it is formidable--I am talking about the military threat--we must also consider their weaknesses. And these, from their viewpoint, are also formidable particularly in the Soviet economy, and there particularly in agriculture, particularly with the Sino-Soviet split--and believe me this is a real, real deep split, and I would not have said this a year and a half ago--in their continuing loss of control over their satellites, and finally and perhaps most important in the fragmentation of communism throughout the world. I mean international communism.

For the foreseeable future and with ever increasing intensity I think you will see continuing emphasis on subversion by the Soviet Union, by Communist China, by Castro communism. But before we get into that, let's take a quick look at the Soviet military strength. These estimates are based on national estimates of the United States intelligence board. They are not something that we have dreamed up alone in the Central Intelligence Agency. They are agreed figures across the boards with the intelligence community. They are based on all sources and some extremely exotic sources not alone technical collections.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

more recent types which are better, are deployed in substantial numbers and are considerably smaller. They are equipped with three megaton warheads which can be increased to six megatons; and with missile modifications this could be raised to ~~tento~~ thirteen megatons. They are reasonably dependent ^{able} and they have an accuracy of one to two nautical miles. Their program is not static. We continue to observe new, larger missiles in development capable of carrying twenty-five to thirty megaton warheads. And while they do not now have, they are capable of developing and probably will develop missiles capable of carrying one hundred megaton warheads.

They are constantly expanding their missile test facilities and hence we would look for evolutionary developments--solid propellants, solid fuels, lighter weights, probably more accurate ICBM's. At the present time solid fuels are used only in their short range missile. They are hardening now their ICBM's. Previously they were all built soft and I think probably because they did not think we ~~were reading their mail~~ ^{had hard intelligence} and now since we have been able to ^{get it and they know we are getting it} ~~read their mail~~ they are beginning to harden their sites.

We know their locations and this is obvious from the remarks that Khrushchev makes periodically as to what we know and what we don't know, what he knows about us and what he doesn't know about us. His sources, of course, are much easier to come by than ours. They also lately have been dispersing their missiles, another sign that they know that we know where they are. About ninety of

SECRET

SECRET

forces, the Soviet Army with their satellites, remains formidable, can be augmented by use of ready reserves and by satellite ground forces, although the dependability of the latter is somewhat questionable and I think in the political atmosphere is getting more and more questionable as time goes on. We think the Soviets could put some fifty to sixty divisions on the line in Western Europe in about thirty days after a decision to move. This would include the twenty-two divisions now in Poland and in East Germany.

We do know that Soviet military doctrine envisages the starting of nuclear warfare either immediately at the outbreak of war or very shortly thereafter. *It* As to the ICBM forces of the Soviet Union, they have eighteen operational ICBM complexes consisting of two hundred and forty pads of which about a hundred and ninety of these are fully operational. We note progress continuously. And we estimate, and this is on the low side, that by 1969 they will have, perhaps, four hundred to seven hundred launchers, pads, fully operational.

STAT

STAT
 And the difference within the intelligence community is negligible, the *Army* ~~Army~~ Navy tending to be on the low side, the Air Forces tending to be on the high side, the rest of the community tending to be right about the figures I gave you.

The Soviet ICBM's are large ones. The first models that they made have been virtually abandoned and they are now producing

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

more recent types which are better, are deployed in substantial numbers and are considerably smaller. They are equipped with three megaton warheads which can be increased to six megatons; and with missile modifications this could be raised to ^{about} thirteen megatons. They are reasonably dependent and they have an accuracy of one to two nautical miles. Their program is not static. We continue to observe new, larger missiles in development capable of carrying twenty-five to thirty megaton warheads. And while they do not now have, they are capable of developing and probably will develop missiles capable of carrying one hundred megaton warheads.

They are constantly expanding their missile test facilities and hence we would look for evolutionary developments--solid propellants, solid fuels, lighter weights, probably more accurate ICBM's. At the present time solid fuels are used only in their short range missile. They are hardening now their ICBM's. Previously they were all built soft and I think probably because they did not think we ~~were reading their mail~~ ^{had hard intelligence} and now since we have been able to ^{get it and they know we are getting it} ~~read their mail~~ they are beginning to harden their sites.

We know their locations and this is obvious from the remarks that Khrushchev makes periodically as to what we know and what we don't know, what he knows about us and what he doesn't know about us. His sources, of course, are much easier to come by than ours. They also lately have been dispersing their missiles, another sign that they know that we know where they are. About ninety of

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

their launchers will probably be hardened in 1965 and by 1969 at least half of them will be hardened. This we get directly from the source, an ad lib statement that Khrushchev made at a cocktail party one evening, and we have no reason to doubt it.

We know considerable about the Soviet strategy for the use of ICBM's, and their plans for large yield warheads as contrasted to ours.

25X1

25X1

We have located about seven hundred and fifty medium range ballistic missiles and intermediate range ballistic missiles-- that is launched ^{at} positions. They are capable of carrying warheads up to two to three megatons, can be increased to five megatons. Their deployment is rather skillfully arranged around the Soviet Union with the majority deployed in the Western Soviet Union so that they can completely cover--and I will tick these countries off-- Western Europe, Britain, Spain, North Africa, Turkey, Greece, India, Pakistan, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan and interestingly enough most of Communist China. And to this I will address myself a little later on.

Those bases are also being hardened, and, ^{such} I as I say, we have identified some hundred and forty sites so far. These missiles are identical with those that they deployed in Cuba in 1962. They

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

have been extensively tested; they are reliable; they are accurate; and they could deliver several thousand megatons, which is a fairly formidable threat against the free world, particularly in Europe.

So the Soviets have a very extensive air defense system-- surface to air missile protecting all of their major cities and industrial complexes which have a population of over one hundred thousand. There are over nine hundred installations with six missile launchers at each installation and we know that these surface to air missiles have a capability up to at least eighty thousand feet. In addition, they have some eighty sites for ^{defense against} low level attack and these seem to be increasing.

We, therefore, conclude from these figures that the Soviet Union has good protection against manned aircraft and a successful attack will require sophisticated techniques and improved air to ground offensive missile systems. As to their own aircraft capabilities, offensive, the Soviets seem to have pretty well frozen at about two hundred long range bombers and at about nine hundred fifty medium range bombers, of which approximately fifty are supersonic. We would expect to have this force decreased gradually through normal attrition. They have a supersonic short range bomber and they have the capability of developing a long range supersonic bomber. However, we have no evidence of their doing so.

Their submarine fleet consists of about four hundred submarines of all types, including more than thirty that are nuclear

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

powered. They have about forty-five which carry two or three surface launched ballistic missiles with ranges of three hundred and fifty miles. Two or three of these could probably fire from under the water at ranges of about seven hundred miles. Currently, however, they are emphasizing construction of cruise missile submarines and most of the new units carry this weapon system.

The larger nuclear powered "E" class Soviet submarines carry six or eight cruise missiles which have ranges up to four hundred and fifty miles. This is a fairly formidable submarine force as you can readily see. Their principal research and development right now is in the antimissile field. For several years they have carried on extensive research and development at Sary Shagan in central Soviet Union. They have attempted a number of missile intercepts and other types of research. And they have a tremendous effort in this particular field.

One antiballistic missile installation, involving three complexes, has been under construction at Leningrad for two years and they are now undertaking one in Moscow--as I say, a fairly formidable military threat both offensively and defensively. However, they have troubles partly because of this. They have troubles with their Soviet economy. Khrushchev's policies call for an aggressive foreign policy backed by a large military establishment, improvement in the Soviet standard of living, and the good things of life, and you hear him even now periodically talking about this,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

and a commitment to catch up and pass the United States in both industry and agriculture in the near future.

Now, these latter two have fallen by the wayside--the improvement in the standards of living and the increase in industry and agriculture over that of the United States. They have been frustrated in this, I think, probably because of the vast expenditures required in developing their military capability. Although throughout most of the 1950's the Soviet economy expanded rapidly, their agriculture improved, their industrial investment and productivity and, therefore, their production increased; and it was a period when military costs were relatively stable and personnel strengths declined.

The reversal started in 1958 when their military expenditures started to increase, and they are now forty percent right now above the '58 level and this increase is entirely attributable to procurement of military hardware with no discernible increase in military manpower or military pay or related costs. The conclusion that we draw from this, therefore, is that devoting an ever increasing amount of material and human resources on sterile military production has prevented these social benefits that Khrushchev has sought.

Concurrently, their industrial growth has slowed since '59 and their agricultural production has dropped since '60. The total annual agricultural production today is approximately the same as it was in 1956, some eight years later. And the per capita

~~SECRET~~

production is, therefore, considerably less because of increased population. We, therefore, note food shortages throughout the Soviet Union. Housing starts are down. The production of consumer goods is at a very low level and as a result we note considerable disenchantment and distress; it is rather endemic among the Soviet population. Their gross national product increased through the '50's twice as fast as the United States, averaging about six percent per year through the '50's. Since '58, however, with this increase in military expenditure the growth rate has declined and for the past two years has been about two and one half percent. It may be better in '64, however, because agricultural production, I think, will improve somewhat over that of the past two years.

Perhaps, because of this they have undertaken a review of their own ^{foreign} military aid program and are suffering cutbacks. They dropped it from a 1960 peak of one and one half billion to only four hundred million in 1962--this without the benefit of Congressional hearings also. This, however, is not my problem; I just put this in for our good friend Congressman Zablocki who is a supporter.

Internal demands are forcing a rise in imports; this has been evident. And imports for the past several years have exceeded exports by several hundred million dollars--last year two hundred million. Petroleum exports have leveled off. The Soviet appear unable to increase their share of the market. In

ILLEGIB

other words, in the long pull their economic situation, their industrial situation, their agricultural situation is weak. Their agricultural reserves, for example, have dropped to an unacceptable level. Twenty percent of their grain requirements for last year, 1963, were purchased from free world sources. Indications are that grain will also be purchased this year but perhaps in a lesser amount.

So all of this trouble, and it is trouble, has caused an increased demand on the part of the Soviets for external credits. It has caused a drastic decrease in their gold reserves which now stand at about one point four billion versus three billion about three years ago; and in summary, therefore, we believe they are economically in trouble primarily because of the heavy military spending. We see no sign of a military cutback and, therefore, the impact of the economic problems on the military and space programs in the future will continue and may get worse.

It could be alleviated and probably will next year somewhat by increased agricultural production, if it does come about, and some additional foreign long term credits. But these will not wholly answer the problem.

That pretty well, I think, wraps up the difficulties of the Soviet Union. I would like to go to several other areas which are of interest because they relate directly to this problem.

You had a thorough briefing, I think, on Communist China. The one thing there of very real interest is the increasing deployment of Chinese troops along the Sino-Soviet border and an equal and in some cases larger deployment of Soviet troops along the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet border. This is a very interesting development and we are watching it very closely; we don't have a good reading on it; we can't yet read the serial numbers on the under shirts of each soldier on either side. We are working very hard at it but it is a very interesting development; [the impact of it yet, I don't know; but,] of course, it is part of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

In Cuba despite the disenchantment and disillusionment on the majority of the people, it is totally Castro controlled and they can express their resentment only by apathy, no capacity for active rebellion. Castro has a very tight hold on the security forces in Cuba and on the military and this is increasing daily. They are both competent; they are both well organized; they have learned much from the Soviet guidance they have received over the past three years.

His economy, however, is in extremely bad shape. The high price of sugar last year gave him a favorable trade balance in excess of a hundred million dollars and should do it again this year so he can go into the market and buy a number of things that

he needs for improvement. I think I should point out that the operations of the Cuban exiles which have been so recently expressed in the press have been grossly exaggerated. Many of them are myths.

The exiles are not organized and to our knowledge there is no concerted effort to invade Cuba or to establish effective guerrilla operations on the islands. Sometimes we are inclined to think that these problems are all blessings to us. If you remember four or five years ago whenever anything was directed against the free world or against the United States Government you could look directly to the monolithic structure of the [communist] international communism which centered in Moscow, in the Soviet Union, and the satellites, and there was no Castro at the time, and Communist China ^{was} geared to that type of international communism. So you knew where the trouble spot was; you knew from what source you were being hurt; and you could direct your efforts against that single source, the Soviet Union, as portrayed by their own brand of international communism.

Now, we are in a different position. We have the Soviet Union held back to defeat capitalism in the free world and rule the world, no question about it. We have Communist China with their own brand of international communism in direct conflict with this previously monolithic structure out of Moscow but still with the same basic designs against the free world and against our type of life.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

In addition to those two now, and they are operating world-wide and in many cases they are counterproductive against each other, in addition to those we have right in our own back yard an even different type of Castro subversion which again is designed to the same purpose but perhaps on a more limited scale. So when something does happen we, in the United States, we in the free world, can no longer say this is the cause, this is the source from which this is coming, we must sit down and analyze which one of these three and perhaps many more sources is the sore spot.

I think it is interesting and perhaps helpful and this, to me, is a very good sign that the Soviet grip on the satellites is weakening. There no longer exists even with the satellites this monolithic structure that I have mentioned. We, now, see something that looks almost like a commonwealth of communist states with each of the states insisting on more and more independence, more rights to deal diplomatically with other nations including those of the free world, more rights to deal economically and directly with the West, and increasing resentment over the fact that communist policies have not provided them with a better way of life.

Now, where this will all lead us, I don't know. None of us know. We are all worrying about it and thinking about it and I am sure you are and this is one of the main purposes, I hope, of this exercise here. Where this is all leading us at the moment we do not know, but we do not think, at least we, in the intelligence community,

~~SECRET~~

do not think that the monolithic structure of international communism can be recreated. We do not think this. And yet, on the other hand, we cannot put our finger on any communist government that has given up its communist form of government.

Therefore, while the situation may be encouraging from this viewpoint and we should, in order to get the title of this talk into this act, exploit the vulnerabilities of the communist world, we certainly can't invite any complacency. [In Laos--I won't cover Laos in its entirety, you can read most of that in the newspapers, as well as in South Vietnam, as well as in Cyprus, but] I would like to give you a broad brush of what the situation is in the Southeast Asian area as we see it.

The outlook is for continued and intensified military activity in South Vietnam, continued attempts in Laos to expand the communist position there by any means just short of that which will generate intervention, direct military intervention, ^{in force} on the part of the free world that is in force. And they will continue strong international diplomatic and propaganda campaigns to neutralize all of Southeast Asia.

The communists are hard at work throughout the areas to portray the indefensible and intolerable and no future position of the United States and the allies and to point out that the eventual communism of all of Southeast Asia is inevitable. As I say, this is their portrayal; this is their propaganda line. They

~~SECRET~~

say that finally the United States will despair even of negotiating an acceptable solution and certainly they will not get involved in winning one by force of arms. This is the propaganda line, you understand.

One of their principal propaganda gambits is that the United States is only feigning or masking their determination for political purposes during the election campaign and that the paper tiger will give up and go home after November. Interestingly enough, the Cuban communists are spreading the same type of propaganda throughout Latin America. It seems to me our only possibly reply, and I may be treading on policy makers now, is to permit nothing to detract from the proof of our determination not to fall for any of these things that the propaganda line is putting forward; and, if necessary, in the process, make the operation just as painful and as totally uncomfortable and unacceptable to the communists as it is for us or more so. And this we are doing.

I say this we are doing; this is the position of the United States Government at the policy level and this is what all of our efforts in CIA, Defense, and State, and AID and others are geared to. I would hesitate to get into a discussion of Cyprus because that continues to remain such a sore trouble spot with really no defensible solution that anyone has put forward yet, that we foresee nothing but trouble there over the long period of time.

SECRET

That is a little bit like Alexander the Great, I guess, when he was dying on his death bed--I guess that is what you do on a death bed--in any event he was dying, he was about twenty-eight years old and he had conquered most of the world, but he had come up against a cropper pretty well and he said in inimitable Alexander the Great language, "How in the hell did I get into this fix?" Part of this we can say here in this country and in the free world but I am inclined to think that the Soviet Union and their satellites and Communist China are saying this to themselves too, "How in the hell did we get in this fix?"

So as I see it we have tremendous opportunities from here on out for increasing the frictions in Sino-Soviet split, really increasing them, covertly and overtly. I see a great future in this international communism split from our viewpoint. I think things are looking better and this is not because we are coming up on November. We, in the Central Intelligence Agency, are political eunuchs; we are totally unsexed, politically, but I don't think there is any cause for real depression, for real pessimism.

Just before coming up here General Wooten said, "How are you going to get off of that podium?" And I said, "Gee, I don't know. What I am most worried about is how I am going to get up on it." They had been regaling me, General Griswold and General Wooten, with stories of speakers who had come up here and looked at this vast audience of unresponsive faces and had gone into a dead faint and

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

had to have been hauled out and revived and then came back and giggled for an hour.

I find no lack of responsiveness on your part. I am delighted at the manner in which you have accepted me as a substitute and I hope that I will be able to answer some of your questions, if you have any, later on. If I can't answer them, I assure you, I can so confuse the issue that we can go on to something else.

In any event in order to get off this podium, and I see my time is just about up, I am reminded of another thing that happened to me when I was incarcerated in the Department of State; and, believe me, I enjoyed the service there, every bit of it, and I have seldom been associated with such a high type of person and such a fine dedicated group of people as I have been in the State Department. The only one that so far I have found to beat it has been the CIA.

While there I was fortunate to be invited to the home of the Norwegian Ambassador in Paris. General Marshall whose horse I was still holding, Mr. Bevin, Mr. Bidault, the foreign ministers of England and France, were there and about a dozen of us Indians. And after the dinner the three principals had to leave for a plenary session and the rest of us stayed around having coffee and cigarettes. After what seemed to be an appropriate time I looked around to see who was going to make the first move. I was certainly the most senile and baldest there if not the oldest. So

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I decided to make the first move. And in my best State Department approach I went over to the Ambassador's wife and I said, "Thank you so much. I have had a delightful evening." And that was strictly out of the book. So she looked up at me and she had these-- well, she looked up at me and said, "Must you go now?" Well, I hadn't gone any farther in the book. I reverted to the military and blurted out, "Well, ma'am, I can't very well stay all night." That is not the half of it. She looked up at me; she had these great, beautiful, great big blue eyes and she looked up at me and with the slightest cleavage of a smile she said, "Oh, General, I had not hoped for such a favor at this our first meeting."

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

29 JUL 1964

Lieutenant Colonel Irving A. Goldner, USAF
Assistant Executive Officer
The National War College
Washington, D. C. 20315

Dear Colonel Goldner:

In response to your letter of 24 July to General Carter, I am returning the transcript of General Carter's lecture to you with certain changes the General has made. When the corrections are made and the new version completed, you may feel free to file the final copy in your library under appropriate security safeguard.

General Carter appreciates your kind expressions regarding his presentation.


Sincerely,

/s/


Executive Assistant

25X1

Enclosure

 :blh (29 July 1964)

Distribution:

- 0 & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - ER w/cy/ *basic*
- 1 - DDCI Speech file w/basic
- 1 - EHK chrono

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from
Classified inclosures

NWC-1304-10

24 July 1964

Dear General Carter:


Reference is made to your lecture, "Exploiting the Vulnerabilities of the Communist World," given at The National War College on 17 July 1964 to the members of the Defense Strategy Seminar.

Enclosed is the stenotypist's transcription of this lecture in duplicate. We would like to make a final copy for our library but to be sure we have made no major errors would you please look it over and return the original copy to us with the necessary editorial changes made thereon?

Again, may I express our appreciation for this splendid presentation.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely yours,



IRVING A. GOLDNER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Asst. Executive Officer

1 Encl
as (Cys 1 and 2)

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

EXPLOITING THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD

By

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter

"This is an official document of The National War College. Quotation from Abstracts from, or reproduction of all or any part of this document is NOT AUTHORIZED without specific permission of the Commandant of The National War College.

Presented at
The National War College
Washington, D. C.
17 July 1964

NWC SECRET

Control No. 854-64

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

SECRET

copy #1 of 4 copies

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

Next 21 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

3 June 1964

Dear Mr. McCone:

We are happy that you have accepted the Commandant's invitation to address the members of the Defense Strategy Seminar on Friday, 17 July 1964. The administrative details for your visit follow.

Your lecture is scheduled to begin at 8:45 A.M. and will be followed by the usual question and answer period and discussion group meeting. We hope your schedule will permit you to remain with us throughout the morning in order to participate in these sessions.

We would like to have you as our guest at a luncheon to be held at 12:00 o'clock at the Fort McNair Officers' Club. A small group composed of seminar staff and class members will be in attendance.

Your lecture will be transcribed by our stenotypist and sent to you for editing. After editing, and provided the lecture is unclassified and you give your consent, the lecture will be reproduced and distributed to those in attendance. This policy is a departure from our regular National War College course, where lectures are not distributed. Classified lectures will not be distributed but will be edited and retained in our classified library.

Visual aids can be prepared for you if you will advise me of your needs. Likewise, transportation can be provided to bring you to the College. In order that the Commandant may have a brief visit with you before the lecture, I suggest that you plan on arriving at approximately 8:25 A.M.

Enclosed is a requisites form to assist you in providing the necessary information. I would appreciate receiving it at the earliest practicable date.

A copy of the seminar syllabus will be forwarded to you at a later date.

We look forward with pleasure to your return to the College.

Sincerely yours,

**1 Encl
as**

**J. K. RIPPERT
Colonel, USA
Executive Officer**

**The Honorable John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.**

7/1/64 FR 64-3442

May 12 1964

Dear Mr. McCone:

We are delighted to learn from your letter of 7 May, that you will be able to address the Defense Strategy Seminar-1964 on 17 July.

You, of course, have complete license to treat the subject "Exploiting the Vulnerabilities of the Communist World," in the manner you deem most appropriate. When the printers complete the Seminar Syllabus, we will send you a copy together with a letter covering the administrative details of your visit. In the meantime, I am enclosing an outline of the topics for your information.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

1 enclosure
as stated

FRANCIS H. GRIEWOLD
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commandant

The Honorable John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

11 May 1964

ILLEGIB

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

File

April 28 1964

DEAR MR. McCONE:

The National War College, under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will conduct the annual Defense Strategy Seminar during the period 5 - 15 July 1964. The Seminar brings together approximately 230 selected Reserve Officers, prominent in their communities and representing a large cross section of civilian professions, particularly business, education and law.

The curriculum of the Seminar covers a wide range of problems facing the United States today, with the objective of developing a greater appreciation of both the national and international aspects of U. S. national security in the Cold War. In the short time available, we strive to stimulate added interest and thought relative to plans, programs and strategies in support of the national objectives, so that the participants may better understand the mutuality of military and civilian interests involved in securing and maintaining the nation's security.

It gives me great pleasure to extend to you a most cordial invitation to address the members of the Seminar on the subject, "Exploiting the Vulnerabilities of the Communist World," at 2:40 a. m., Friday, 17 July. The scope of the subject would be to assess the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the communist system and to discuss ways in which they may be exploited.

The members of the Defense Strategy Seminar will have security clearance through SECRET. You should have no concern as to how freely you may speak during your lecture or the question and answer period. All your remarks will be held in strictest confidence, and will not be attributed to you by members of the Seminar outside of The National War College.

219/201

In the event you desire additional information or assistance in preparing your address, please do not hesitate to call on any of us here at the College. Captain Ernest M. Beauchamp, USN, (Oxford 5-8431) is our faculty member most familiar with the Defense Strategy Seminar-64. He will be available to you at any time.

Aware of your complex schedule, we remain hopeful that you will find it possible to accept our invitation and thus lend your experience and prestige to our Seminar.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM H. GREENOLD
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commandant

The Honorable John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

I hope my remarks have been helpful.

I wish you all the very best. Profit now by your opportunity for
more learning and advancement.

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

DTR 11-63

SECRET

1 July 1964

Executive Registry

64-4849

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Support *AMW* 7 JUL 1964

SUBJECT: Aims and Purposes of the Orientation Course for
Agency Officials Attending Senior Service Schools


1. This memorandum is for information only. A number of the Agency's outstanding men have been selected to represent the CIA in various service schools during the next year. They will be in contact with hundreds of military officers and civilian government officials, most of whom will rise to positions of responsibility and influence in their own organizations in the next few years.

2. The military officers and civilian officials with whom our people will be in contact are a cross-section of the American public and will have some of the suspicions of the Agency and misconceptions of its activities which one finds among the uninformed public at large. Therefore, CIA representatives to the senior service schools must be as effective as possible in their contacts with others, regardless of the subject discussed.

a. They must have a good knowledge of the Agency's organization and its mission and functions so that they can clarify its role and discreetly defend it against the misinformed.

b. They should have a good knowledge of the Agency's relationships with the military services and other government agencies and departments, particularly those relationships in which friction has tended to develop in the past.

c. They must be aware of some of the facts behind certain CIA operations which have come to the attention of public media and for which the Agency has been criticized.

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: Aims and Purposes of the Orientation Course for
Agency Officials Attending Senior Service Schools

3. The following are some of the operations about which a discussion of the facts and what can be said about them would be helpful:

- a. The U-2
- b. The Bay of Pigs
- c. South Vietnam
- d. Laos
- e. The Congo, with particular emphasis on our recent role there
- f. Iran
- g. Guatemala
- h. National Security Council control over the Agency's covert action operations and the coordination of such operations with other agencies and departments.
- i. CIA's position on the "Congressional Watchdog Committee" proposal

All of the facts cannot be revealed to the participants in the seminar, and the details of many of these operations cannot be disclosed to people outside the Agency. However, suggestions regarding the effective handling of questions about the operations listed above would be most helpful.

[Redacted Signature Box]

MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL
ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R0001500010003-4

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Director of Training

EXTENSION

NO.

DTR H-63

3245

DATE

1 July 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Deputy Director for
Support
7D26 Hqrs

7/1/64

7/7/64

SKW/RC

2.

3. Executive Registry
7E12 HqrsJUL
1964JUL
1964

Bf

4. Executive Director
7/7

DM

5. Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence
7D6011 Hqrs

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

610

USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL
USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

SUBJECT: Invitation to Address the Orientation Course for Agency
Officials Attending Senior Service Schools


1. On 13, 14, and 15 July, an Orientation Course for Agency officials attending senior service schools will be held in Room 803, Broyhill Building. These Agency officials will be in contact with hundreds of military officers and other government officials, most of whom will rise to positions of responsibility and influence in their own organizations in the next few years. They should be well prepared to represent the Agency in the best possible manner.

2. The content of the course will consist of two parts:

a. The Agency organization and its functions; the Agency's role in the coordination of clandestine operations with the military services; the Agency's relationship with public media; and a discussion of certain sensitive operations which have come to the critical attention of public media.

b. Instruction in Conference Techniques, given by one of the outstanding teachers of the subject in this area. Effectiveness in conference discussions is important because so many of the school programs require extensive participation of students in small working groups.

3. You are invited to present the subject "Agency Operations Which Have Come to the Attention of Public Media" which is scheduled at 1500-1630 hours on Wednesday, 15 July. A draft schedule of the program which lists the specific subjects to be covered during these three days is attached. Should you require assistance in arranging for your presentation, please contact Mr. [redacted], Orientation and Briefing Officer, extension [redacted].

25X1
25X1MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of TrainingAttachment:
Draft Schedule**SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE		INITIALS
1	RDC1				
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks:					
<p>This is 15 July item. I mentioned this morning. I'll ask OTR to put together some selected items. 1500 - 1630 Weds. 15 July</p>					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.					DATE
					30 June

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500010003-4

STAT